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STRICT LIABILITY WITHIN THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
ACT: DOES IT BELONG?
Smith v. Pena
621 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1980)
In Smith v. Pena,I the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit addressed the issue of the combined effect of the Federal
Tort Claims Act 2 and the Illinois Dram Shop Act.3 The FTCA subjects
the United States Government to tort liability for certain negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions of its employees. 4 The Illinois DSA, how-
ever, is based on a theory of strict liability and imposes tort liability
regardless of fault on those tavern operators who serve alcoholic bever-
ages to one who becomes intoxicated and while in an intoxicated state
causes personal injury or property damage.
5
The role of strict liability within the framework of the FTCA has
been the subject of much controversy. 6 While the FTCA states that the
applicable state law of the place where the tort occurred shall be used
to determine the Government's liability,7 the United States Supreme
Court has held that there is an exception to this rule when the applica-
1. 621 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1980).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the FTCA] provides in pertinent
part:
[T]he district courts ...shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as the DSA] provides in
pertinent part: "Every person who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person, has
a right of action in his own name, severally or jointly, against any person who by selling or giving
alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of such person."
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
5. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1979).
6. In United States v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949), one of the first cases
interpreting the FTCA, the Supreme Court squarely rejected a strict interpretation of the statute in
the context of the anti-assignment exception to the Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity
contained within the Act. Later, in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953), the Court
strictly construed the waiver of immunity, and held that strict liability could not be imposed on
the Government.
Since Dalehite, commentators have speculated about what the Supreme Court's view is on the
subject. See generaly Reynolds, Strict Liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act." Does "Wrong-
ful" Cover a Few Sins, No Sins, or Non-Sins? 23 AM. U.L. REV. 813 (1974) [hereinafter referred to
as Reynolds].
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
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ble state law imposes strict liability. Under such circumstances the
Government will not be held liable.8 However, the legislative history
of the Act indicates that the Court's exclusion of strict liability from the
FTCA may not have been warranted. 9 Consequently, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Smith was caught in the middle of the controversy when it was
called upon to find a remedy for the plaintiffs under the FTCA when
the applicable state law, the Illinois DSA, imposed strict liability. The
Seventh Circuit held that if the plaintiffs were able to meet the require-
ments of the DSA, and in addition prove that the Army employees
were negligent according to Illinois law, they would not be deprived of
a remedy under the FTCA. t0
This comment will first discuss the legislative history of both the
FTCA and the DSA and evaluate their combined effect. The specific
factual details of the case and the Seventh Circuit's opinion will then be
presented. Finally, an analysis and critique of the court's decision in
Smith will be presented. The comment will conclude that although the
court in Smith properly "custom-fashioned" a remedy so as to avoid
the strict liability exception to United States Government liability
under the FTCA, it is this restrictive interpretation of the FTCA itself
which merits re-examination.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Federal Tort Claims Act
No court has jurisdiction to entertain suits against the United
States except where Congress has consented. '' The terms of Congress'
consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to enter-
tain the suit. 12 In 1946, after nearly thirty years of Congressional con-
sideration, the Seventy-Ninth Congress enacted the FTCA,' 3 which,
8. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953).
9. See text accompanying notes II to 57 infra for a discussion of the legislative history of
the FTCA.
10. 621 F.2d at 880-81.
11. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1941).
12. Id at 586.
13. See note 2 supra for the text of the FTCA. The FTCA was passed for the purpose of
insuring that the individual or entity injured by government action would not be forced to shoul-
der the entire loss but could take advantage of the Government's unique ability to spread the cost
of the injuries. It also served to recognize the inherent fairness in placing the loss on the party
who set in motion the force which caused it, rather than upon the innocent, often previously
uninvolved victim of the force's operation. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 833-34. When losses
caused by such negligence are charged against the public treasury they are in effect spread among
all those who contribute financially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden on
each taxpayer is relatively slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may
leave him grievously harmed. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957).
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with various exceptions, 14 subjects the United States Government to
tort liability for certain negligent or wrongful acts of its employees.
The language of the Act makes the United States liable, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under similar
circumstances, for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of Govern-
ment employees 15 acting within the scope of their employment.' 6 The
statute provides that the Government's liability is to be determined by
the law of the place where the negligent act or omission occurred,'
7
which enables the federal courts to treat the United States in the same
manner as a private citizen would be treated under similar circum-
stances. 18
While Congress desired to waive the Government's immunity19
from suit for the actions of its agents who cause injuries to person and
property while acting within the scope of their employment, it was not
intended that the Government should be subject to liability arising
from acts of a governmental nature or function.2 0 Thus, exceptions 21 to
the Act were created to preclude any suits against the Government
growing out of an authorized activity where no negligence on the part
of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for the suit is
the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be
tortious. 22 The exceptions protect the Government from tort liability
for errors in administration or in the exercise of discretionary func-
tions.23 Thus, where an official's action or inaction requires the exer-
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) provides in part:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
. . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
15. "Employee" is defined to include "members of the military or naval forces of the United
States, and any person acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671 (1976).
16. Id at § 1346(b).
17. Id Where the negligence and the injury occur simultaneously in a single jurisdiction, the
law to be applied is clear, and no interpretation of the words "the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred" is required. However, in multi-state tort actions, deciding the applicable law
becomes more difficult. Normally, the law of the jurisdiction where the acts of negligence took
place is applied. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1962).
18. A section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole act in
which it is contained: "We must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Mastro Plastics v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956).
19. See note 100 infra for a history of sovereign immunity.
20. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-30 (1953).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2860 (1976). See note 14 supra for the text of this section.
22. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30-36 (1953).
23. A "discretionary function" is one in which an official has a power and duty to make a
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cise of discretion, the official is not liable for harmful consequences
flowing from his conduct as long as he acts within the scope of his
authority.
24
Requirement of a Negligent or Wrongful Act
The phrase "negligent or wrongful act or omission" in the FTCA25
has been the subject of much controversy in determining what is neces-
sary to impose liability on the Government. In Dalehite v. United
States,26 an action was brought under the FTCA to recover damages
for a death resulting from an explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer,
which was being produced according to the specifications and under
the control of the United States.27 The United States Supreme Court
held that the claim was based upon the exercise or performance of a
discretionary function or duty within the meaning of the exceptions
contained in the Act; as a result, the Government was immune from
any negligence liability. 28 The petitioners also claimed that the nitrate
fertilizer was an "inherently dangerous commodity" and that the Gov-
ernment was engaging in an "extrahazardous" activity.29 When any
damages result from the decision to engage in an "extrahazardous" ac-
tivity, strict liability is imposed on the tortfeasor irrespective of the
tortfeasor's conduct. 30 Consequently, the petitioners asserted that the
Government should be held strictly liable for the accident without any
regard to negligence. 3' The petitioners relied on the presence of the
word "wrongful" in the FTCA in addition to "negligent" to indicate
that Congress did not intend to limit liability to negligent torts only.
32
The Court, however, rejected the petitioners' claim, holding that the
choice among valid alternatives. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions,
77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Jaffe].
24. "Discretionary function or duty" that cannot form a basis for suit under the Act includes
more than the initiation of programs and activities; it also includes determinations made by execu-
tives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. The Act is
also not intended to authorize suit for damages to test the validity of or provide a remedy on
account of such discretionary acts even though negligently performed and involving an abuse of
discretion. Adopting regulations for the preservation of public health, passing ordinances, pre-
scribing and regulating the duties of policemen and firemen, are generally regarded as examples of
discretionary activities, because in their nature they are legislative. See Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
26. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
27. Id at 17-18.
28. Id at 17-45.
29. ld at 44-45.
30. Id at 44.
31. Id at 44-45.
32. Id at 45. See note 2 supra for the text of the Act.
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Act required some brand of misfeasance or nonfeasance, 33 and thus did
not apply to absolute liability situations. 34 In support of this holding
the Court stated: "Had an absolute liability theory been intended to
have been injected into the Act, much more suitable models could have
been found.
35
Nonetheless, the word "wrongful" has become the lever through
which judges have either expanded or reduced federal tort liability.
36
While the Court in Dalehite ruled that the word "wrongful" did not
add absolute liability to the coverage provided by the Act, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Praylou37 equated "wrongful" with the Restatement of Torts definition
of "tortious,"38 and held that tortious activity included the concept of
strict liability. The Fourth Circuit stated that "[t]o say that a tort giving
rise to absolute liability is not a wrongful act would be a technical re-
finement of language incompatible with that liberal interpretation of
the sovereign's waiver of immunity which the highest court in the land
has admonished us to employ. ' 39 In Praylou, actions were brought
against the United States under the FTCA for damages caused by the
falling of airplanes operated by government employees in the course of
33. Id. "Misfeasance" is defined as the improper performance of some act which a man may
lawfully do. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 902 (5th ed. 1979). "Nonfeasance" is defined as the
omission of an act which a person ought to do. Id at 950.
34. 346 U.S. at 45.
35. Id. Another view on the availability of more suitable models can be found in Maryland
ex ref Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1947):
Congress was creating a liability not theretofore existing on the part of the government.
To have defined all of the tort rules under which liability could be established would
have been an almost impossible undertaking; but standards of liability were necessary
and Congress was compelled, as a practical matter, to adopt the principles and standards
of local law in defining them.
36. The term "wrongful" was added after the term "negligent" with some intention of ex-
panding liability. The problem has been determining how far beyond traditional negligence prin-
ciples that liability should be expanded. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 815-16.
37. 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954).
38. The word "tortious," which means "wrongful," is:
appropriate to describe not only an act which is intended to cause an invasion of an
interest legally protected against intentional invasion, or conduct which is negligent as
creating an unreasonable risk of invasion of such an interest, but also conduct which is
carried on at the risk that the actor shall be subject to liability for harm caused thereby,
although no such harm is intended and the harm cannot be prevented by any precau-
tions or care which is practicable to require.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6, Comment a at 12 (1965).
39. 208 F.2d at 294, quoting Purcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110, 116 (S.D.W.Va. 1951).
See United States v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949), where the Court observed,
"We think that the Congressional attitude in passing the [FTCA] is more accurately reflected by
Judge Cardozo's statement in Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-
30: 'The exemption of the sovereign from suit, involves hardships enough where consent has been
withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been
announced.'"
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government business.40 The applicable state law imposed strict liability
on owners of aircraft for injury caused by its flight, irrespective of neg-
ligence. 4' The Government relied on the decision in Dalehite and as-
serted that it could not be held liable because the FTCA requires a
negligent act and does not hold the Government liable in strict liability
situations.4 2 The Fourth Circuit, however, stated that while the lan-
guage in Dalehite lent some support to the Government's argument, the
doctrine laid down in Dalehite was not intended to apply to a case such
as Praylou, where the result of its application would be absurd.4 3 The
Fourth Circuit stated that it would be contrary to the requirement of
the FTCA that the United States be liable "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual in like circumstances" if it were
to hold that the Government would be liable only on a showing of
negligence, whereas a private individual would be held to the strict lia-
bility of a state statute. 44
The decision in Praylou achieved a position of prominence in the
area of government liability when certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court,45 but only until an opposite view was expressed in
Laird v. Nelms. 46 Laird concerned property damage which resulted
from a sonic boom caused by United States military planes.4 7 The
plaintiffs were unable to show negligence in the planning or operation
of the flight but asserted they were entitled to proceed on a theory of
strict liability for such ultrahazardous activities conducted by the Gov-
ernment, based on the decision in Praylou.48 The Supreme Court in
Laird reaffirmed Dalehite and thereby rejected the plaintiffs argument,
holding that the language of the FTCA did not permit, under any cir-
cumstances, the imposition of liability upon the Government where
40. 208 F.2d at 292.
41. Id
42. Id at 292-93.
43. Id. at 295.
44. Id
45. 347 U.S. 934 (1954). This denial was interpreted by many commentators as an indication
that the Supreme Court had accepted the Praylou rationale. See, e.g., Reynolds supra note 6, at
822-23; Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 STAN. L. REV. 433, 434 (1957)
[hereinafter referred to as Peck]. Additional support for this view was commanded when the
Supreme Court acknowledged Praylou in a footnote in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
315, 319 n.2 (1957).
Although the Court in Rayonier did not discuss the concept of strict liability, it did overrule
the Fourth Circuit finding that a state law imposing strict liability for uncontrolled fires was not
applicable to public firemen. Id at 320-21.
46. 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
47. Id
48. Id at 798.
504
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there had been neither a negligent nor-a wrongful act.49
The Court in Laird stated that the Praylou decision was inconsis-
tent with Dalehite, in that Dalehite did not depend on the factual differ-
ences of whether the Government was handling a dangerous property
as opposed to operating a dangerous instrument, but rather that the Act
did not authorize the imposition of absolute liability of any sort upon
the Government.50
Justice Stewart, dissenting in Laird, stated that nothing in the his-
tory of the Act supported the notion that strict liability was considered
inapplicable in cases arising under the FTCA.5' Stewart interpreted
the history of the phrase "negligent or wrongful act or omission" to
include the entire range of conduct classified as tortious under the state
law, 52 and stated that "[t]he only intended exceptions to this sweeping
waiver of governmental immunity were those expressly set forth and
now collected in § 2680." 53 Justice Stewart reviewed the legislative his-
tory of the Act and stated that while a bill passed by the Senate in 1942
covered only actions based on the "negligence of Government employ-
ees,"'54 the House Committee later substituted the phrase with "negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission." 55 The reason for the change was
that the "committee prefers its language as it would afford relief for
certain acts or omissions which may be wrongful, but not necessarily
negligent. ' 56 According to Justice Stewart, the legislative history of the
Act seems to indicate that Congress intended "wrongful" to be inter-
preted more broadly than was done in Laird.
57
Thus, Laird represents the Supreme Court's most recent decision
on the role of strict liability within the FTCA framework. However, as
pointed out by Justice Stewart, there is still some question as to
whether the Supreme Court has correctly interpreted the legislative his-
tory of the Act, and the role of strict liability within the Act.
49. Id. at 798-99.
50. Id at 803.
51. Id at 805.




56. Id quoting H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., 11. The language used by the
House Committee was carried over into the bill finally enacted in 1946, without further mention in
the Committee reports of the intended scope of the words "wrongful act." Id
57. According to Justice Stewart, the holding in Laird was contrary to the whole policy of the
FTCA. Id at 809.
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The Illinois Dram Shop Act
At common law, the sale or gift of intoxicating liquor to a strong,
able-bodied man was not an actionable tort and did not give rise to suit
against a tavern owner for the torts of the tavern's patrons.5 8 Courts
held that no causal connection existed between the sale or gift of the
beverage and the subsequent actions of the intoxicated individual.59
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, state legislatures
began to provide a statutory remedy for those injured by an intoxicated
individual against the person who sold or provided the intoxicating li-
quor.60 In Illinois, the General Assembly enacted the Liquor Control
Act, commonly referred to as the Dram Shop Act.61 The Illinois DSA
imposes strict liability on those who sell liquor on the retail market for
damages which result from intoxication caused by liquor they have
sold or given. 62 While the object of the statute is to punish those who
furnish the means of intoxication by making them liable for damages,
the statute is also designed to encourage temperance in the consump-
tion of alcohol.
63
The DSA was established as the exclusive remedy against tavern
operators and owners of tavern premises for injuries to person, prop-
erty, or means of support in the Illinois Supreme Court case of Cun-
ningham v. Brown.64 In Cunningham, an action was brought by an
administratrix and widow suing for damages caused to her and her
children on the ground that the decedent became intoxicated from al-
coholic beverages served him by the defendants, and as a result of such
58. See, e.g., Cruse v. Aden, 127 111. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
59. There was no common law liability predicated on the sale or gift of liquor to an able-
bodied man because the voluntary action of the man drinking the liquor was considered to be the
cause of his intoxication and the proximate cause of any damages which resulted; the damages
were not considered caused by the sale or gift of the intoxicants to the drinker. Responsibility for
his intoxication and for any injuries resulting from such intoxication rested at common law on the
able-bodied person who drank the liquor and became intoxicated. Moran, Theories of Liability,
1958 U. ILL. L.F. 191, 192.
In the few older cases where the common law has recognized a remedy against the provider
for damage caused by a person's intoxication, the intoxicated person to whom the liquor was
furnished was incapable because of drunkenness, infancy or mental debilitation of resisting either
the consumption or the effect of the beverage. Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act and the
Common Law.- A Continuing Drama, 5 J. MARSH. J. 342, 344 (1972).
60. See generally Edge, Dram Shop Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 19 A.F. L.
REV. 218 (1977).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1979). See note 3 supra for pertinent part of the DSA. The
general subject of the liquor trade in Illinois is covered by chapter 43 of the Illinois Revised
Statutes under the title "The Liquor Control Act." However, when the term "Dram Shop Act" is
used, the speaker is generally referring only to section 135 of chapter 43.
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1979).
63. Ogilvie, History andAppraisal of The lllinois Dram ShopAct, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 175, 181.
64. 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961).
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intoxication decedent took his own life.65 The plaintiffs claim was
based not only on a violation of the DSA, but also on a common law
negligence theory. 66 The plaintiff sought the common law remedy in
addition to the remedy provided under the DSA so that she would not
be limited to the damages provided under the DSA.67 The common
law claim was based on a theory that when a sale of intoxicants is made
to one who is intoxicated or insane, and that incapacity is or should be
known to the vendor, the sale and consumption are merged and be-
come the act of the seller and the proximate cause of the injury or dam-
age.6
8
The substantive issue in the common law claim was one of first
impression before the court, as there were no cases prior to the enact-
ment of the original DSA where recovery was sought from a supplier of
alcoholic liquor for damages inflicted by an intoxicated person.69 The
court stated that "[aifter passage of that act [the DSA] and its subse-
quent amendments, all actions against tavern owners were brought
under the statute. ' 70 Further, the Cunningham court stated that the leg-
islative history of the DSA indicated that the "legislature did not intend
the act to be complementary to a common law right it knew nothing
about, but, on the contrary, intended to create a remedy in an area
where it believed none existed." 7' The court stated that while plaintiff's
common law argument had some merit, the lack of common law prece-
dent for such liability motivated the legislature to create the DSA to be
applied in such situations.72 Thus, if the court were to allow the plain-
tiffs a common law remedy in addition to the remedy provided in the
DSA, the remedial purpose of the DSA would be undermined. Also,
the effect of applying the common law would be the same as applying
the DSA, except that the damages recoverable would be higher.73 The
legislature, however, did not intend the common law to complement
the DSA. Consequently, the plaintiffs common law claim failed, and
Cunningham established the DSA as the exclusive remedy against tav-
ern operators and owners of tavern premises.74
However, the decision in Cunningham did not completely settle the
65. Id at 24, 174 N.E.2d at 154.
66. Id
67. Id at 24, 174 N.E.2d at 155.
68. Id at 30, 174 N.E.2d at 157.
69. Id at 25-26, 174 N.E.2d at 154-55.
70. Id at 26, 174 N.E.2d at 155.
71. Id at 29, 174 N.E.2d at 156.
72. Id at 30, 174 N.E.2d at 157.
73. Id
74. Id
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issue of the common law's role within the framework of the DSA, espe-
cially in situations where the DSA is found to be inapplicable. Such
was the case in Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store,75 where a
diversity action was brought by plaintiffs who alleged that the defend-
ants had furnished intoxicants in Illinois to the owner and driver of an
automobile. Subsequently, their car collided in the state of Michigan
with an automobile in which the plaintiffs were riding, causing injuries
to the plaintiffs. 76 In Waynick, it was argued that no common law lia-
bility attached to the defendants, and that the DSA was the exclusive
remedy against the tavern operators. 77 However, it was held in El-
dridge v. Don the Beachcomber, Inc. 78 that the Illinois DSA has no ex-
tra-territorial effect; thus the Illinois DSA does not apply to situations
such as that presented in Waynick, where the tortious act occurs
outside the state of Illinois as a result of the sale of intoxicants in
Illinois. 79 Like the Illinois DSA, the Michigan DSA also has no extra-
territorial effect.80 Thus, there was a void in the law in cases where the
DSA was found to be inapplicable.
The Seventh Circuit in Waynick turned to the common law for a
remedy, stating that "[i]f the common law does not cover the situation
before us, there is actually no law applicable," 8' which would leave the
plaintiffs without a remedy. To settle the issue, the Seventh Circuit
held that because the DSAs of both Illinois and Michigan were inappli-
cable, the common law of Michigan, the place where the tort occurred
would be applied to fill the void that is left when the DSA is inapplica-
ble.8 2 Michigan common law indicated that while there was generally
no common law duty on a vendor of intoxicating liquors to a third
party, in some circumstances there may be such a duty when the sale is
made to one already intoxicated, or known to be a drunkard.8 3 The
court stated that every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary
care not to injure others by any agency set in operation by him.84 A
75. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
76. Id at 323-24.
77. Id at 324.
78. 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1951).
79. Id at 154, 95 N.E.2d at 515. The appellate court based its decision on the premise that if
the legislature wanted the DSA to have extra-territorial effect it would have so provided. Id
80. 269 F.2d at 324.
81. Id
82. Id at 325. The Seventh Circuit stated that when given a choice between the law of the
place where the negligent act or omission occurred, and the law of the place where the injury or
death was inflicted, the law of the situs of the tort, meaning the place where the injury or death
was inflicted, governs the liability and substantive matters. Id.
83. Id at 325-26.
84. Id at 325.
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vendor serving alcohol to one already intoxicated is wilfully violating
this duty to one other than the consumer, and the vendor's actions are
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by that third party. 85 The
Seventh Circuit held that the sale of the intoxicants by the defendants
in Waynick to one who was already intoxicated was a breach of this
common law duty, and liability was imposed on the defendants. 86 De-
spite the fact that the DSA was inapplicable, the Seventh Circuit al-
lowed the plaintiffs a remedy based on a theory of common law
negligence.
87
A similar fact situation occurred in Colligan v. Cousar,8 S where an
action was brought against several defendant tavern operators who
served intoxicants in Illinois to one who, while driving an automobile
in Indiana in an intoxicated condition, injured the plaintiff. As in Way-
nick, the Illinois DSA had no extra-territorial effect. 89 In an attempt to
apply the common law of the place where the tort occurred, the appel-
late court discovered that Indiana had no common law on the issue.
Consequently, the court was compelled to determine what the common
law of the forum state of Illinois would have been had there been no
DSA in existence. 90
The appellate court in Colligan held that when the defendants
continued to sell alcoholic beverages to the parties after they were in-
toxicated, they violated the duty imposed on them by the DSA, and
also their common law duty to use care to avoid injury to others by any
agency they set in operation. 91 Under the circumstances the court held
that the acts of the defendants were acts which, had there been no DSA
in Illinois, would have given rise to a common law cause of action on
behalf of the plaintiff.
92
In summary, Cunningham established that the DSA is the exclu-
sive remedy in Illinois for the injured party against tavern operators,
and that it was not intended to complement a common law remedy.
However, in situations where the DSA is inapplicable, the courts in
Waynick and Colligan determined and applied what the common law
would have been had there been no DSA in existence.
85. Id
86. Id at 326.
87. Id
88. 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963).
89. Id at 397, 187 N.E.2d at 294.
90. Id at 403, 187 N.E.2d at 296-97.
91. Id at 414, 187 N.E.2d at 302.
92. Id
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SMITH V. PENA
Facts of the Case
On January 27, 1978, Stephen and Cynthia Smith were traveling
in an automobile when Robert Pena's automobile crossed the center
median line of the road and struck the plaintiffs' vehicle head-on, caus-
ing serious personal injuries to the Smiths.93 Pena's reckless manner of
driving was directly caused by his excessive consumption of alcoholic
beverages served him by Army employees at the Rock Island Arsenal,
Rock Island, Illinois.
94
Count I of plaintiffs' complaint, brought under the FTCA, alleged
that Army employees negligently served alcoholic beverages to Pena
which caused him to become intoxicated and that his intoxication
caused the accident. 95 In Count II, plaintiffs relied on the Illinois DSA.
They alleged that the Army sold and served liquor to Pena and that as
a result of consuming the liquor, Pena became intoxicated and, while in
a drunken condition, caused the accident. 96 The Illinois DSA imposes
strict liability; therefore plaintiffs did not allege negligence in the sec-
ond count of their complaint. However, in their brief on appeal, plain-
tiffs argued that they were entitled to proceed on Count II under the
Dram Shop Act if they were able to prove negligence on the part of the
federal tavern keeper.
97
The federal district court dismissed both counts of the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 98 The
judge concluded that under Illinois law, the Dram Shop Act is the ex-
clusive remedy for acts within its coverage, so that no common law
negligence claim (Count I) was possible. 99 As to Count II, the court
held that the FTCA could not support a claim brought under the Dram
Shop Act because the DSA is a strict liability statute and the waiver of
sovereign immunity'0° under the FTCA does not extend to strict liabil-
93. 621 F.2d at 875.
94. Id
95. Plaintiffs further contended that these employees knew or should have known the exces-
sive drinking habits of Pena and also of his inebriated condition, yet they permitted him to leave
the arsenal driving an automobile. Id at 875-76.




100. The Government enjoyed "sovereign immunity" prior to passage of the FTCA. This
meant that the Government avoided liability in tort under all circumstances. The origin of the
idea stems from the common law theory that "the King can do no wrong" and that it was a
contradiction of his sovereignty to allow him to be sued as of right in his own courts. See gener-
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ity torts.' 0 The decision of the district court deprived plaintiffs of any
claim against the Army.
The Seventh Circuit's Decision
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit addressed the issue of whether one who seeks damages for per-
sonal injuries can invoke the FTCA by alleging negligence when, were
he to sue in an Illinois court, his claim would be governed by a strict
liability statute.'0 2 The Seventh Circuit held that the DSA did not de-
prive plaintiffs of a remedy within the jurisdictional coverage of the
FTCA if they were able to meet the requirements of the DSA and, in
addition, prove that the Army employees were negligent according to
Illinois law.103 The court, therefore, vacated the dismissal of the com-
plaint and remanded the case to provide plaintiffs an opportunity to
amend their second count to include an allegation of negligence.' °4
Reasoning of the Majority Opinion
The court in Smith resolved the conflict between the liability re-
quirements of the FTCA and the DSA by holding that if the plaintiffs
were able to meet the requirements of the Illinois DSA, and in addition
prove that the Army employees were negligent according to Illinois
law, then the DSA would not deprive them of a remedy within the
jurisdictional coverage of the FTCA.'
0 5
To arrive at this decision, the court distinguished Dalehite, which
had been relied on by the trial judge. First, the Seventh Circuit stated
that there was no negligence action possible in Dalehite because the
type of activity engaged in by the United States in that case fell within
the "discretion" exception of the FTCA,1° whereas the negligent acts
of the Army employees in Smith were not within this exception.1
0 7
Second, the court asserted that the plaintiffs alternative claim in
Dalehite, based on'the theory of strict liability, was barred because the
FTCA required some "misfeasance or nonfeasance" and so could not
ally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers.- Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1963).
101. 621 F.2d at .875.
102. Id at 874-75. See text accompanying note 17 supra for discussion on determination of
the applicable law.
103. Id at 880-81.
104. Id
105. Id at 880.
106. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
107. The Army did not contend that the operation of an arsenal which dispensed alcoholic
beverages fell within the discretion exception of the Act. 621 F.2d at 877.
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extend to liability without fault. However, in Smith the court noted
that the plaintiffs did not rest their claim on a theory of strict liability;
rather, they asserted that although their claim fell within the parame-
ters of the Illinois statute, they were prepared to prove that the Army
employees were in fact negligent. Had the plaintiffs in Smith relied
solely on a strict liability claim, Dalehite would have barred their re-
covery. However, by also alleging negligent conduct, their claim con-
formed to the Dalehite requirement of a showing of some misfeasance
or nonfeasance.
Consonant with the language of the FTCA, 108 a private tavern
owner in these circumstances would also have been liable under the
Illinois DSA. 0 9 However, the conflict was not solved at this point be-
cause the FTCA requires the federal defendant's conduct to be negli-
gent and under the Act, negligence must be determined according to
Illinois law. " 0 Because the applicable state law, the DSA, could not be
used to determine if the defendant's conduct was negligent, I"' the court
had to determine if an Illinois court faced with the same issue would
find the Army's conduct to be negligent.
The court in Smith reviewed the evidence that the Illinois
Supreme Court would consider in determining what constitutes negli-
gence in respect to tavern operators. 1 2 In Cunningham, the Illinois
Supreme Court had recognized a distinction between selling alcoholic
beverages to a sober person and to one who is intoxicated and stated
that under the latter circumstances it may be plausible to impose com-
mon law liability on the vendor. "13 However, in Cunningham the plain-
tiff claimed she was entitled to both a common law remedy and the
remedy provided under the DSA. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
her claim, holding that the DSA provided the exclusive remedy against
108. The FTCA holds the federal government liable as a private individual would be in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1976).
109. 621 F.2d at 877.
110. The court noted that a negligent tavern operator will always be liable under the Dram
Shop Act even though proof of negligence is not required. The significance of the absolute liabil-
ity theory upon which the Dram Shop Act is based is that non-negligent as well as negligent
tavern owners are liable. Because the Dram Shop Act is an absolute liability statute, it imposes
liability on more persons than with a traditional negligence cause of action. For the negligent
tavern operator, the result is identical. Id at 880.
1i1. The Dram Shop Act imposes strict liability without any consideration given to negli-
gence. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1979).
112. In Huffv. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977), a products liability case, it
was stated that a federal court may evaluate and look to whatever data the state supreme court
would consider in determining what constitutes negligence.
113. 22 Ill. 2d at 30, 174 N.E.2d at 157. See text accompanying notes 64-74 supra.
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the dram shop operators in Illinois and was not intended to comple-
ment a common law remedy." 
4
However, the Smith court found that in a situation where the DSA
was inapplicable, the appellate court in Colligan v. Cousar relied on the
common law to find a remedy for the plaintiffs. 15 In Co//igan the ap-
pellate court reasoned that if the common law were not referred to in a
situation where the DSA is inapplicable there would be a void in the
law, and consequently the plaintiffs would have no cause of action
against the tavern operators. 1 6 The appellate court in Colligan relied
upon a common law negligence theory and held that the acts of the
defendants in serving the intoxicants to the tortfeasor were acts which,
had there been no DSA in existence in Illinois, would give rise to a
common law cause of action on behalf of those injured by the
tortfeasors. " 17
The fact situation in Smith was similar to that of Colligan in that
in both cases the Illinois DSA was inapplicable. Thus, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Smith viewed the Colligan holding as a guide to the path the
Illinois Supreme Court would follow if presently faced with the ques-
tion before it. 118 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit in Smith held that the
Illinois Supreme Court would hold that when a tavern operator know-
ingly sells liquor to a person already intoxicated and that person causes
injuries, the operator is liable for his negligence which proximately
caused the injuries inflicted.' 19 The court accordingly held that if the
plaintiffs could prove that under Illinois law the Army employees were
negligent in serving drinks to Pena because he was intoxicated or for
any other reason which would negate his self-control and thus establish
the causation, their FTCA action could be maintained.
20
114. Id
115. 38 IlI. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963). See text accompanying notes 88-92 supra.
116. Id
117. Id at 302.
118. Also, in an analogous situation, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed a common law cause
of action by finding a negligent first actor to be the proximate cause of injuries when an interven-
ing second actor was the one who inflicted the harm. The facts indicate that the owner of a parked
car left his keys in it. A third person took the car and while driving it injured another. The
owner's act in negligently leaving his keys in the car was held to be a proximate cause of the
injury. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 I11. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
119. 621 F.2d at 880.
120. Id Policy considerations also support the court's decision. The Illinois legislature im-
posed absolute liability under the Dram Shop Act because they wished for both penal and reme-
dial purposes to impose liability on more tavern operators, not fewer, than if a negligence
standard were used. The court stated that it would be incongruous, in the circumstances where the
state cast its net wider than in a traditional negligence action, to automatically excuse a Govern-
ment employee from liability if his negligence could not be proved. Id
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Reasoning of the Dissent
Judge Wood, dissenting in Smith, was of the opinion that the ma-
jority custom-fashioned a remedy for the plaintiffs.' 2' He emphasized
that Cunningham had established that there is no common law on the
subject and that the Illinois DSA is the exclusive remedy in Illinois
against tavern operators.'
22
Judge Wood asserted that Dalehite represented the Supreme
Court's decision on the issue of strict liability within the FTCA frame-
work. 123 To further develop his point, Judge Wood relied on the more
recent decision in Laird, where the Supreme Court concluded that the
Act does not authorize the imposition of strict liability of any sort upon
the Government.124 Thus, Judge Wood viewed the majority's decision
in Smith as an "original hybrid" law for Illinois with no purpose other
than to permit plaintiffs a cause of action under the FTCA.
25
ANALYSIS
The decision in Smith is consistent with the goal behind the FTCA
which is to hold the Government liable for the torts of its employees in
the same manner as a private individual would be liable in similar cir-
cumstances.' 26 While the outcome of the case is consonant with this
goal, the means which the Seventh Circuit used to arrive at this result
were "custom-fashioned" in that neither the FTCA nor the DSA was
applied as the language of these acts suggest. The reason the Seventh
Circuit found it necessary to "custom-fashion" this remedy was be-
cause it was bound by the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Dalehite and Laird which hold that strict liability cannot be imposed
on the Government under the FTCA. 127 This "custom-fashioned"
remedy approach is a reasonable application of Illinois law in a situa-
tion where the DSA does not apply and is justifiable given the desire to
provide the injured plaintiffs with a remedy against the tavern opera-
tor. However, the legislative history of the FTCA indicates that the
121. Id at 881.
122. Id Judge Wood further stated that Colligan, relied on by the majority as indicating what
the common law of Illinois may have been in the absence of the Dram Shop Act, was of no
consequence because Illinois in fact does not have any common law on the subject, but does have
the Dram Shop Act to rely on. Id at 882.
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id at 883.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
127. Although the majority in Smith made no mention of Laird Laird represents the latest
decision by the Supreme Court on governmental liability and should have been discussed.
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decisions in Dalehite and Laird may not have correctly determined the
place of strict liability within the FTCA framework.'
28
The "Custom-Fashioned" Remedy
The FTCA states that the applicable state law should be applied to
determine the Government's liability. 29 The applicable state law in
Smith was the DSA. However, it was not applied by the Seventh Cir-
cuit because the United States Supreme Court in Dalehite had held that
the FTCA's requirement of a negligent or wrongful act did not include
the imposition of strict liability on the Government. 30 In order to con-
form to the Dalehite holding the Seventh Circuit added an additional
requirement to the DSA by insisting the plaintiffs not only prove that
the defendants had violated the DSA, but also that the defendants were
negligent.' 3' While the addition of this requirement was inconsistent
with the language of the DSA which provides for strict liability without
any regard to negligence, it was a necessary measure in order to pro-
vide the plaintiffs with a remedy.
Before the Seventh Circuit could require the plaintiffs to prove
negligence on the part of the defendants in addition to a violation-of
the DSA it was necessary to distinguish the Illinois Supreme Court de-
cision in Cunningham. Cunningham held that the DSA is the exclusive
remedy in Illinois against tavern operators and was not intended to
complement a common law remedy.' 32 The Seventh Circuit did this by
reasoning that while the plaintiff in Cunningham was claiming entitle-
ment to two remedies-that provided in the DSA and also one under a
negligence theory-the situation in Smith was greatly different. In
Smith the DSA was inapplicable, and without a common law remedy
the plaintiffs would be deprived of any remedy against the tavern oper-
ators. Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that in a situation where the DSA
is inapplicable it is permissible to determine what the common law
would have been if there were no DSA in Illinois. 133 This holding an-
ticipates what the Illinois Supreme Court would probably decide if
faced with a case where the DSA is inapplicable. To hold otherwise
would leave a void in the law and plaintiffs would be left with no rem-
edy against the tavern operators. Keeping in mind that the goal of the
128. See text accompanying notes 11-57 supra for a discussion of the history of the FTCA.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). See note 17 supra.
130. 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953).
131. 621 F.2d at 880-81.
132. See text accompanying notes 64-74 supra.
133. 621 F.2d at 879-80.
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DSA is to impose liability on more rather than fewer tavern operators
by holding them strictly liable for the torts of their customers, it is con-
sistent with this goal to hold negligent tavern operators liable in cir-
cumstances where the DSA is inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit also
found support for this holding in its own previous decision in Waynick
and in the Illinois Appellate Court decision in Colligan where the com-
mon law was also determined and applied in situations where the DSA
was inapplicable.
134
The Seventh Circuit's "custom-fashioned" remedy approach in-
volves a reasonable determination and application of Illinois common
law in a situation where the DSA does not apply. It also satisfies the
restrictive interpretation of the FTCA under Dalehite and Laird. How-
ever, it is this interpretation of the FTCA which merits re-examination.
Re-examination of Strict Liability Within the FTCA Framework
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was
unable to apply the FTCA in a manner consonant with its language,
which calls for the application of the law of the state where the tort
occurred. In Smith the applicable law was the DSA. However, the
Seventh Circuit was required to look beyond the DSA to determine
what the Illinois common law of negligence under the Smith facts
would have been had the strict liability statute not been enacted. The
fact remains that the DSA does exist and should have been applied. As
a result of the exception the United States Supreme Court has read into
the FTCA when the applicable state law is a strict liability statute,
lower courts are required to find a way to conform to that holding in
whatever way they can. However, this exception for strict liability is
not warranted under the language of the Act. If Congress had intended
to exclude strict liability from the Act, then the legislators' desire for
comprehensive and unambiguous draftsmanship would have dictated
that strict liability be included in the list of exceptions.
135
When the FTCA was passed strict liability was firmly established
in the tort law of almost all the states. As the Act provides for applica-
tion of the law of the state where the alleged tort by the Government
has occurred, 136 it logically follows that if the applicable state law im-
134. See text accompanying notes 75-92 supra.
135. See note 14 supra for the text of the exceptions.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). The wording of the Act strongly indicates that state law
controls what constitutes a "wrongful act" under the statute. Moreover, state law and not federal
law has been used to give meaning to other crucial words in the FTCA. State law determines
whether an "employee" was working within the course of his employment. Williams v. United
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poses strict liability, Congress must have intended for the Government
to be held to the same standard or strict liability would have been in-
cluded in the list of exceptions. As noted by one commentator, to read
into the statute an exception for strict liability causes an unreasonable
departure from the use of local standards and defeats the policy of uni-
form treatment regardless of whether a defendant is an individual or
the Government. 1
37
Moreover, the legislative history of the word "wrongful" in the
FTCA indicates that it was added to expand the Government's liability
beyond liability for negligence. 38 To exclude strict liability from
within its scope makes "wrongful" very limited in its application. Since
there is nothing in the Act which indicates that a "wrongful" act re-
quires blameworthy or socially disapproved behavior to any degree
greater than that which tort law normally requires for liability, strict
liability should be included within the definition of "wrongful." If
"wrongful" is not expanded, the FTCA is not equating the Govern-
ment's liability with that of a private person. 
139
The dissent in Smith viewed Laird as being dispositive of the case
because the Laird decision reaffirmed Dalehite. 40 However, Laird has
been regarded by some commentators as being an anomaly-a retreat
from the progressive direction in which the Supreme Court appeared to
be moving. 141 The Laird decision ignored the predominant purpose of
the FTCA, which is to make the state law determinative of what consti-
tutes a "wrongful" act. Thus, the Laird decision, as the decision in
Dalehite before it, did not correctly interpret the language of the
FTCA.
It is unfortunate that the Seventh Circuit had to decide the case by
referring to the common law for a remedy when there is a remedy al-
ready provided in the DSA. As the language of the FTCA clearly
states that the law of the place where the tort occurred should be ap-
States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955). The phrase accepting liability in "accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred" has been interpreted to incorporate the whole law,
including the conflict of law rules, of that place to ensure that the United States is treated as a
private individual under like circumstances. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1962).
Thus, it seems incongruous to state that Congress intended to use the law of the state except when
the applicable law of the state is strict liability.
137. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 823.
138. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra for a discussion of the legislative history of the
FTCA.
139. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 815-19.
140. 621 F.2d at 882.
141. See Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Callfor Review and Revision of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
48 WASH. L. REv. 391 (1973).
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plied, the Illinois DSA should have provided the remedy. However,
because the Dalehite and Laird decisions have not given the FTCA the
interpretation it warrants, the Smith court found it necessary to look
elsewhere to find a remedy. If the FTCA were administered as its lan-
guage suggests, the Seventh Circuit would not have had to look any
further than the Illinois DSA.
CONCLUSION
Imposition of strict liability on the Government is not precluded
by any provision of the FTCA, nor does the legislative history of the
Act evidence any intent by Congress to exclude it. Nonetheless, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the Government cannot be
held strictly liable under the FTCA. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit
in Smith could not apply the FTCA in a manner consonant with its
language. Instead of applying the applicable state law as the FTCA
requires, the Seventh Circuit was compelled to look beyond the DSA to
determine what the law would have been had the DSA not been en-
acted. The fact remains that the DSA does exist and it should have
been applied.
Until the FTCA is interpreted as its language warrants, plaintiffs
will either find no relief in strict liability situations against the Govern-
ment, or courts will have to look past the applicable state law to find a
remedy wherever possible. This defeats the purpose of the Act and
leads to inequitable results. Today the Government is involved in an
ever-increasing variety of extra-hazardous activities, such as supersonic
flights, nuclear energy programs, and blasting, which typically carry
with them the application of strict liability to those engaging in the
activity. If a private individual were involved in the activity, that indi-
vidual would be held strictly liable for any injury or damage caused by
his choice to engage in such an activity. The FTCA states that the
Government should be treated as a private citizen. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has held that strict liability cannot be imposed on the
Government under the FTCA. Despite the Supreme Court's holding
there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act which indicates that
even though a private citizen engaging in these types of activities will
be held strictly liable, the Government will be immune from suit. Such
a result is at odds with the basic rationale of the Act.
It is suggested that Congress intercede to settle the dispute over the
role of strict liability within the framework of the Act. Then the Gov-
ernment will be treated as a private individual under like circum-
NOTES AND COMMENTS 519
stances, and the courts will not have to look to the common law for
relief as the Seventh Circuit did in Smith, but rather will find it in the
applicable statutes of the state whose law governs.
PATRICK F. LUSTIG

